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States rely on state ownership of the beds of streams, rivers,
and lakes for various regulatory and proprietary purposes.
These include licensing of bed use, leasing of underlying miner-
al rights, protection of public use rights, assertion of public trust
powers, and location of boundaries of abutting privately-owned
land. The extent of this state ownership in states created from
federal territories is determined by a conjunction of the follow-
ing: (1) the "equal footing rule," (2) the law of federal land patent
interpretation, (3) state rules on incidents to title to abutting
uplands, (4) federal and state definitions of navigability, and (5)
the law of implied grants of land from the sovereign. States
have asserted title to the beds of many streams, rivers, and lakes
by assuming the correctness of certain interpretations of these
rules of law. This article will reexamine those interpretations.
This reexamination is timely for two reasons. First, there is
no clear authority on the question whether states created from
federal territories have title to the beds of inland waters de-
clared to be nonnavigable under federal law for bed title pur-
poses. Second, the basic structure of bed title law itself was
thrown into question in 1973 by a decision of the United States
Supreme Court.1 The Court corrected its position in 1977 and
restored the former bed title law.2 This article will summarize
the basic structure of bed title law and will examine its current
status under the recent Supreme Court decisions. It will then
analyze the cases to determine the location of title of beds of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A. 1959,
Haverford College; LL.B. 1963, University of Wisconsin; S.J.D. 1972, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
2. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977).
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federally nonnavigable inland waters when a state created from
a federal territory asserts such title.
II. SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF BED OWNERSHIP
A. Equal Footing Doctrine
The common law recognized that title to beds of navigable
waters was in the Crown, both in England 3 and in the colonies.
4
At that time navigable waters were defined as those affected by
the ebb and flow of the tide.5 The thirteen original states ac-
quired title to the beds of navigable waters as successors to the
Crown.6
The United States acquired title to the beds of navigable
waters of federal territories because it was the territorial
sovereign prior to the creation of new states.7 Territorial
sovereignty was the origin of all bed titles in the Midwestern and
Western states, including Nebraska. The United States held title
to such beds in trust for the future states to be created out of the
federal territories. 8 It also held title to the beds of nonnavigable
waters incident to its proprietorship of the public domain be-
3. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13,57 (1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) *367, *410 (1842).
4. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 85-86 (1926); Morris v. United
States, 174 U.S. 196, 226-27 (1899); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49, 57
(1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) *367, *410 (1842).
5. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11, 57 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661,
667 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337 (1876) (dictum).
6. See Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15, rehearing denied, 296
U.S. 664 (1935); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 86,89 (1926); Morris
v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226-27 (1899); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
15-18, 49, 57 (1894); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183
(1891); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) *367, *410, *416 (1842). See also Bonelli Cattle Co.
v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1973) (title was not acquired at time of
ratification of the federal Constitution as the Court indicates, but at the
time of the Revolution).
7. See Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15, rehearing denied, 296
U.S. 664 (1935); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 25 (1935); Brewer-Elliott
Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas,
258 U.S. 574, 583 (1922); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 259 (1913);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49, 57 (1894); Knight v. United States Land
Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873).
8. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
373 (1977); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1926); United
States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404 (1903); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 49-50, 57 (1894); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183
(1891); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873).
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cause such bed titles were incidents to title in the abutting up-
lands under the common law.9
When new states were created from federal territories and
admitted to the Union, they were admitted on an equal basis
with the thirteen original states. This is the so-called "equal
footing rule"'10 mandated by the federal Constitution.1 The new
states acquired title to the beds of navigable waters upon admis-
sion to the Union because the thirteen original states held such
title.12 Only title to the beds of waters navigable at the time of
9. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U.S. 574, 595-96 (1922); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1891).
10. The term "equal footing" is derived from language appearing in the
compact between the original states and the people and states within the
Northwest Territory as enacted in the Northwest Territory Ordinance of
1787, 1 Stat. 51, 53 n.(a) (1845). Article V provides: "[Sluch State shall be
admitted... into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing
with the original States, in all respects whatever. . . ." Id. at lxii. Similar
"equal footing" language also appears in subsequent acts establishing ter-
ritories and in acts of admission.
The equal footing rule applies only to new states which were created out
of federal territories. Therefore, the rule has no application in the thirteen
original states, in their derivatives (Maine and West Virginia), in states
which formerly were independent nations (Hawaii and Texas), or in pres-
ent federal territories (District of Columbia).
11. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
374 (1977). See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
12. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) *212, *223, *229-30 (1845);
Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) *471, *478 (1850); Mumford v. Wardwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Knight
v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28, 57
(1894); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168
U.S. 349, 358-60, 365 (1897); Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U.S. 479, 483
(1903); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391,404-05 (1903); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 451 (1908); Scott
v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,
259-60 (1913); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 583 (1922); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77, 83 (1922); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 55 (1926); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64,75 (1931); United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6, 14 (1935); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10,
15, rehearing denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935); United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19, 30, 36 (1947); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,318 (1973); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd.
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370, 372-74 (1977).
See also Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1311(a), (b)
(1970) (Congress expressly ceded beds of navigable waters and marginal
seas to the states). The Act reverses United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,
31-39 (1947), which held that the United States owned the beds of the
marginal seas below the low water mark.
Where the state retains title to the beds of inland waters, the upland
riparian's title runs to the ordinary high water line in most states. A few
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admission was transferred to the new states.13
B. Federal Navigability Definition
Prior to 1926, state courts assumed that their own navigabili-
ty definition determined which beds passed to the states upon
admission to the Union. During the ninteenth century, many
states expanded the common law tidal definition of navigability
to include the Great Lakes and great inland rivers,14 or all wa-
ters navigable by commercial vessels or used in commercial
trade. 15 Some states expanded their definitions of navigability
to include all waters which floated sawlogs or recreational
boats.16 The federal courts concurred in this state court assump-
tion that state navigability definitions were controlling. 17
Between 1922 and 1931, the United States Supreme Court
states extend such title to the ordinary low water line. See generally
Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unset-
tled Boundary, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. (1978).
There is a split of authority among the coastal states as to whether a
tidal riparian's title runs to the high or low mean tide mark. Does the recent
extension of federal navigational servitude jurisdiction to the maximum
high tide mark affect the extent of state title to tidal flats and marshes
ceded under the Submerged Lands Act? See United States v. Stoeco
Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (grounded on an analysis of Crown
title to the marginal sea under the common law).
Beds of navigable waters granted to individual landowners prior to
cession of sovereignty to the United States are excluded from transfer to
the states under the "equal footing" rule. Knight v. United States Land
Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183-84 (1891).
13. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
370, 376 (1977); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 15 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931);
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-58 (1926). See also Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (1970).
14. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S.
349, 361-63 (1897); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1892);
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667
(1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1876).
15. For states which followed variants of the commercial navigability defini-
tion for equal footing purposes, see, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey,
53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890); Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury, 178 Cal. 554, 174
P. 329 (1918); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909); State ex rel.
Bd. of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Clark v. Cam-
bridge & Arapahoe Irr. & Imp. Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W. 239 (1895)(dictum).
16. For states which followed the sawlog, recreational boat, or other defini-
tions of navigability broader than the federal commercial navigability defi-
nition for equal footing purposes, see, e.g., State ex rel. Dawson v. Akers,
92 Kan. 169, 140 P. 637 (1914) (navigability by judicial declaration); State v.
Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914); Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53
N.W. 1139 (1893) (by implication and subsequent interpretation).
17. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371, 381-82 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1876).
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decided three cases which smashed that general state court
assumption by holding that the federal definition of navigability
determined which beds passed to the states upon admission.18
Three reasons were given to justify use of the federal rule. First,
the beds of navigable waters comprised part of the public do-
main prior to statehood, and conveyance of federal title is in-
volved under the "equal footing rule."'19 Second, the act of ad-
mitting a state to the Union is a federal action, and federal law,
not state law, should determine what incidents accrue from the
act of admission.20 Third, each new state is to be admitted on an
"equal footing" under constitutional mandate, and there can be
no equality of status unless interpretation of navigability for
bed title purposes is uniform throughout the country.21 The
three cases adopting the federal navigability definition express-
ly rejected the use of various state definitions to determine
which beds passed to the states upon admission.22 Many,23 but
not all,24 state courts have recognized the effect of those deci-
18. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77
(1922). These cases are discussed in Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights
and Title to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 8-
25 (1967).
19. See Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1922).
20. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
21. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); State v.
Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503 P.2d 1231 (1972).
22. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1931); United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1922).
See also United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922).
23. For states which continued to follow or began to follow the commercial
navigability definition for equal footing purposes, see, e.g., State ex rel.
Indiana Dep't of Conservation v. Kivett, 228 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d 145 (1950);
State v. Nichols, 241 Iowa 952, 44 N.W.2d 49 (1950) (by implication); State v.
Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927) (express recogni-
tion that federal definition controls); State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89
N.W.2d 661 (1957) (express recognition that federal definition controls);
County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co., 186 Minn. 401, 243 N.W. 433 (1932)
(express recognition that federal definition controls); State v. Bunkowski,
88 Nev. 623, 503 P.2d 1231 (1972) (express recognition that federal definition
controls); State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros., 86 Nev. 872, 478 P.2d 159 (1970);
Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 200
Okla. 134, 191 P.2d 224 (1948); Monroe v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759
(1946). See also note 69 infra.
24. For states which continued to follow or began to follow the sawlog, recrea-
tional boat, or other definitions of navigability broader than the federal
commercial navigability definition for equal footing purposes, see, e.g.,
Shore v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 55 F.2d 696 (D. Kan. 1931), affd, 60 F.2d 1
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 656 (1932) (judicial declaration of naviga-
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sions of the United States Supreme Court.
The federal bed title navigability definition is similar, but not
identical to, the navigability definition employed for federal
commerce power and navigational servitude purposes.25 In or-
der to be navigable for bed title purposes a stream, river, or lake
must be navigable by customary modes of travel for commerce
in its natural and ordinary condition.26 Natural barriers are not
an impediment to navigability if in fact commerce traffic could
pass the barrier in some fashion at some time during the year.2 7
The federal bed title navigability definition is distinguished
from the commerce power and navigational servitude naviga-
bility tests in two respects. First, rivers which can be made
navigable with "reasonable improvements" apparently are not
navigable for bed title purposes.28 The "reasonable im-
provement" concept has not been expressly rejected for bed
title purposes. However, the concept was introduced in a
commerce power licensing case which stated in dictum that it
was not intended to apply to bed title questions. 29 Although the
"reasonable improvement" concept has not yet been applied to
bed title situations, it has not been precluded from being applied
in the future.
Second, the bed title cases do not require that the subject
waterway be a link in interstate commerce, but only that the
waterway be commercially navigable in isolation.30 That dis-
tinction was made abundantly clear in a recent pair of cases
involving the navigability of the Great Salt Lake in Utah. The
bility); State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314,36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). See also notes 70-71
infra.
25. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971); United States v. Appala-
chian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,408-10 (1940); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64, 75-77 (1931).
26. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 15, 23 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1925); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,86 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,
586 (1922); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891).
27. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1926); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St.
Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897).
28. H. ELLIS, J. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD & J. DEBRAAL, WATER-USE LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION IN WISCONSIN 61 (1970). See United States v. Ladley, 42
F.2d 474, 474 (D. Idaho 1930); State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 537-38, 89
N.W.2d 661, 673 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958). See generally
Johnson & Austin, supra note 18, at 18-19.
29. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408-09 (1940)
(dictum).
30. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
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United States Supreme Court held in 1971 that the Great Salt
Lake was navigable for bed title purposes because some minor
intrastate commercial uses of the lake were made in the
1880's.31 Therefore, title to the bed of the lake had passed to
Utah upon its admission to the Union in 1896.32 Three years
later, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
lake was not navigable for commerce power purposes because
the same minor intrastate commercial uses of the lake were not
part of interstate commerce, but were purely local in nature.33
The court held that a permit was not required under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1897 for construction of a railroad causeway
across the lake. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in 1971
that commercial navigation need not be part of interstate
commerce for bed title navigability purposes reiterated similar
statements in two earlier decisions.34
For bed title purposes, inland waters must be capable of
31. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971). The Court stated: "[T]he fact
that the Great Salt Lake is not a part of a navigable interstate or interna-
tional commercial highway in no way interferes with the principle of public
ownership of its bed." Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 12-14.
33. Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1166-69 (10th
Cir. 1974). The court stated:
[W]e conclude that there was no reversible error [in excluding evi-
dence of commercial navigation across the Great Salt Lake and up
the Bear River to Corinne, Utah] since the proof offered showed
only a connection with the railhead and not with navigable inter-
state waters and, therefore, as a matter of law, could not establish
that the Lake is a "navigable water of the United States" within the
meaning of the [Rivers and Harbors] Act [of 1899].
Id. at 1167.
34. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), required a factual determination
of whether portions of the Colorado River were navigable for purposes of
determining whether the bed underlying those portions of the river had
passed to Utah upon admission to statehood. The Court stated: "The ques-
tion of navigability ... is a federal question. This is so, although it is
undisputed that none of the portions of the rivers under consideration
constitute navigable waters of the United States, that is, they are not navig-
able in interstate or foreign commerce. . . ." Id. at 75.
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935), required a factual determina-
tion of whether Malheur Lake in Oregon was navigable for purposes of
determining whether its bed had passed to Oregon upon admission to
statehood. The Court stated:
Since the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of federal
action in admitting a state to the Union, the question, whether the
waters within the State under which the lands lie are navigable or
non-navigable, is a federal, not a local one. It is, therefore, to be
determined according to the law and usages recognized and ap-
plied in the federal courts, even though, as in the present case, the
waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id. at 14.
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navigation at the time the state is admitted to the Union. Al-
though actual commercial navigation is not required at the time
of admission, such use must have occurred before or after ad-
mission.3 5 However, actual commercial navigation must occur
at some time; mere capability without use is insufficient. 36
C. Incidents to Federal Land Patent Titles
Title to all public lands and all beds of navigable and non-
navigable waters abutting such lands is conveyed either by fed-
eral land patents or by operation of law. The interrelationship
between the law interpreting incidents to federal land patents
and the law elaborating the "equal footing" doctrine determines
the location of title to beds of navigable and nonnavigable in-
land waters. It is that interrelationship which was the subject of
controversy in two United States Supreme Court cases decided
during this decade.37 The consequences of the interrelationship
between these two bodies of law arise whenever the federal
government patents uplands abutting on navigable or non-
navigable inland waters.
1. Federal Conveyances Before Statehood
An express grant of the bed of federally navigable water by
the United States38 or its predecessors in title39 prior to state-
hood will convey title to the grantee free of any claims to the title
asserted by the state after statehood. Furthermore, the federal
government can reserve title to any such beds before statehood
free of subsequent state title claims.40
35. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64, 81-83 (1931).
36. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 12 (1971). If capability for navigation
existed at statehood, should the location of bed title in the state or the
federal government be determined, not by the character of the stream
itself, but by the fortuity of whether the use for commercial navigation or
the bed title litigation occurs first?
37. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363 (1977), overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). For
discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 54-65 infra.
38. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926) (dictum); Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1922); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574,594-96 (1922); Prosser v. Northern Pac. R.R., 152 U.S. 59,
64 (1894); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47-48, 58 (1894)(dictum).
The power of the United States to convey bed title before statehood is
based on U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
39. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183-84 (1891).
40. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 25, 29 (1935) (nonnavigable waters);
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58 (1926) (dictum). See Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1970). See also United States
v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1970).
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When the abutting upland is patented to a private person
prior to statehood, the effect on the title to the beds of federally
navigable waters is not clear. There are three lines of authority.
One group of cases states that pre-statehood patents to abutting
uplands do not carry bed title with them because the United
States holds title to them in trust for the future states4' and
cannot impliedly grant it away.42 A second group of cases indi-
cates that if the post-statehood rules attach bed title to the land
patent title, then a pre-statehood federal patent will also carry
bed title with it. 43 A third line of cases states that pre-statehood
patents carry title to the bed ad medium filum aquae;" it is not
clear whether this result is based on federal common law or on
post-statehood rules developed by the states.
2. State Control of Beds of Federally Navigable Waters
Upon being admitted to the Union, a state acquires title to the
beds of federally navigable waters under the "equal footing
rule. ' 45 There is no implied reservation of the beds; any reserva-
tion of them prior to statehood must be express. 46 The state may
exercise full proprietary rights to the beds it acquires at state-
hood subject to the exercise of the federal navigation powers.47
41. See note 8 supra.
42. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926); Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,84 (1922) (dictum); Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 51, 58 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672-73
(1891); Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 287-88 (1868); Pol-
lard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) *212, *229-30 (1845).
These cases rely on the Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 9, 1 Stat. 468 (1845)
(current version at 43 U.S.C. § 931 (1970)) (relating to the sale of public lands
in the Northwest Territory), which provides:
[A]ll navigable rivers, within the territory to be disposed of by
virtue of this act, shall be deemed to be, and remain public high-
ways .... [Iln all cases, where the opposite banks of any stream,
not navigable, shall belong to different persons, the stream and the
bed thereof shall become common to both.
43. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); State v. Bunkowski, 88
Nev. 623, 503 P.2d 1231, 1237 (1972).
44. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,595 (1922). Both cases involved rivers held
nonnavigable under federal law.
45. See note 12 supra.
46. See note 40 supra.
47. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 372, 378-81 (1977); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 16, rehear-
ing denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 54, 59 (1926); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63
(1921); Wear v. Kansas ex rel. Brewster, 245 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1917); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53,60 (1913); Donnel-
ly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 261-62 (1913); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229,
242-43 (1913); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S.
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The extent of the upland conveyed under a federal patent is a
federal question, but the extent of incidents to title conveyed by
the patent by federal rule is a matter of state law.48 This rule
controls the location of title to the beds of federally navigable
waters.49 The state may declare that beds of navigable waters
attach to the titles of abutting uplands. If so, when the federal
patent conveys the abutting uplands, the bed titles will go with
those uplands as an incident to title.50 The state may declare that
447, 451-52 (1908); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); United States v.
Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404 (1903); St. Anthony Falls Water Power
Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 361-66 (1897); Hardin v. Jordan,
140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891) (dictum); St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 242 (1891);
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 671 (1891) (dictum); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324, 338 (1876); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-
66 (1873).
48. Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22, rehearing denied, 296 U.S.
664 (1935); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935); Chapman &
Dewey Lumber Co. v. St. Francis Levee Dist., 232 U.S. 186, 196 (1914); Joy v.
City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342 (1906); St. Anthony Falls Water Power
Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 362 (1897); Packer v. Bird, 137
U.S. 661, 669 (1891); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 100 (1871)
(upland); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) *498, *516-17 (1839) (upland).
This rule gives a uniform interpretation to all titles in a state regardless
of whether their source is federal or nonfederal. Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 289 (1868).
49. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 381 (1977); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22, rehearing
denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922) (dictum); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 243 (1913)
(dictum); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447,
451-52 (1908); Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1906); Hardin v.
Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903) (dictum); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co.
v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 366 (1897); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 58 (1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891); Packer v. Bird,
137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876).
50. Those states created from federal territories which transfer title to the
beds of navigable inland waters to the owners of the abutting uplands fall
into three groups (Alaska has no bed title cases).
1. Colorado, Illinois, and Nebraska assert that rule even though they
have no navigable inland waters because they employ the tidal defi-
nition of navigability to designate such waters as nonnavigable al-
though navigable in fact. See, e.g., Colorado: Hartman v. Tresise, 36
Colo. 146, 84 P. 665 (1905).,llinois:Leitch v. Sanitary Dist., 369 Ill. 469,17
N.E.2d 34 (1938) (except Great Lakes and meandered lakes; see note
51(1) infra); Heckman v. Kratzer, 43 Ill. App. 3d 844, 357 N.E.2d 1276
(1976) (by implication). Nebraska.%Valder v. Wallis, 196 Neb. 222, 242
N.W.2d 112 (1976).
2. Wisconsin employs the sawlog or recreational boat definition of
navigability. See, e.g., Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation
Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712 (1949)(rivers).
3. Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio have not defined navigability for
bed title purposes. See, e.g., Kentucky: Commonwealth v. Henderson
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the beds of navigable waters are retained by the state. If so, the
federal patent to abutting fast lands will not carry the bed title
with it; instead the title will remain in the state.5 After state-
County, 371 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1963). Michigan: McCardel v. Smolen, 71
Mich. App. 560, 250 N.W.2d 496 (1976); Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,
57 N.W.2d 462 (1953) (except Great Lakes; see note 51(5) infra). Ohio:
State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121,
36 N.E.2d 453 (1975) (except the Great Lakes; see note 51(3) infra);
Day v. Pittsburgh, Y & C. R.R., 44 Ohio St. 406, 7 N.E. 529 (1886).
For state navigability definition cases, see notes 68-71 infra.
51. States created from federal territories which retain title to the beds of
navigable inland waters fall into five groups (Alaska has no bed title cases).
1. Illinois, Mississippi, and Oregon limit application of the rule to tidal
waters (or other specially designated waters) because they employ
the tidal definition of navigability to designate inland waters as
nonnavigable although navigable in fact. See, e.g. Illinois: Hardin v.
Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903) (meandered lakes); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (Great Lakes only); People ex rel. Scott v.
Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976) (Great Lakes
only; by implication); Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120
N.E.2d 15 (1954) (large lakes); Wilton v. Van Hessen, 249 Ill. 182, 94
N.E. 134 (1911) (dictum) (meandered lakes); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, §
71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (Great Lakes and meandered lakes).
Mississippi: International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway
Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
Oregon: Dahl v. Clackamas County, 243 Or. 152, 412 P.2d 364 (1966);
Brusco Towboat Co. v. State ex rel. Straub, 30 Or. App. 509,567 P.2d
1037 (1977); State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 18 Or. App. 524, 526 P.2d 469 (1974), modified, 272 Or. 545, 536
P.2d 517, 538 P.2d 70 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 363
(1977); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 274.025, .430 (1975).
2. Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming employ the commercial navigability defi-
nition of navigability. See, e.g., Arkansas: Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680,
496 S.W.2d 372 (1973). California: United States v. Gossett, 277 F. Supp.
11 (C.D. Cal. 1967); City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460,
52 P.2d 585 (1935); CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1954). Florida: State v.
Florida Nat'l Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976); FLA. CONST.
art. 10, § 11. Idaho: West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973);
Callahan v. Price, 26 Idaho 745, 146 P. 732 (1915) (overruling prior
law). Indiana: State ex rel. Indiana Dep't of Conservation v. Kivett,
228 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d 145 (1950). Iowa: Mather v. State, 200 N.W.2d
498 (Iowa 1972). Louisiana: State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La.
1974); LA. CONsT. art. 9, § 3; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 453 (West 1952);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1107 (West 1965). Minnesota: State ex rel. Head
v. Slotness, 289 Minn. 485, 185 N.W.2d 530 (1971). Missouri: Hauber v.
Gentry, 215 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1948); State ex rel. Citizens Elec. Light-
ing & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 169 Mo. 109, 69 S.W. 374 (1902).
Montana: United States v. Eldredge, 33 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mont. 1940);
Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417,39 P. 517 (1895); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-302, 67-712 (1970). Nevada: State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623,503 P.
2d 1231 (1972). Oklahoma: Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739
(10th Cir. 1968); Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of
Land Office, 200 Okla. 134, 191 P.2d 224 (1946) (dictum); OKLA. STAT.
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hood, the United States may not by any act divest either the
state52 or the private title holder5 3 of the bed title.
The power of the United States to determine title to beds of
federally navigable waters after statehood was the issue before
the United States Supreme Court on two occasions in this dec-
ade. Both cases involved title to former beds of navigable rivers.
In the earlier case, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,54 the Court
impliedly overturned the general rule that federal law cannot
affect title to beds of federally navigable waters after statehood.
In Bone li a substantial area of land reemerged from the river-
ANN. tit. 60, § 337 (West 1971). Tennessee: Hurley v. American Enka
Corp., 93 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1950); Cunningham v. Prevow, 28
Tenn. App. 643, 192 S.W.2d 338 (1946). Utah: Utah State Road Comm'n
v. Hardy Salt Co., 26 Utah 2d 143, 486 P.2d 391 (1971). Washington:
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306,462 P.2d 232 (1969) (by implica-
tion), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d
799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (owner of abutting
upland has right to accretion); Ghione v. State, 26 Wash. 2d 635, 175
P.2d 955 (1946); WASH. CONST. art. 17, § 1. Wyoming: Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
3. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin employ the sawlog or
recreational boat definition of navigability. See, e.g., North Dakota:
Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955); State v. Brace, 76 N.D.
314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). South Dakota: Hillebrand v. Knopp, 65 S.D.
414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-17-2,3 (1967).
Wisconsin: State v. McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d 492, 215 N.W.2d 459 (1974)
(lakes); State v. McDonald Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 173, 118 N.W.2d
152 (1962) (lakes).
4. Kansas employs another definition of navigability more extensive
than the commercial navigability definition. See, e.g., Grape v. Laib-
lin, 181 Kan. 677, 314 P.2d 335 (1957).
5. Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, New Mexico, and Ohio have not de-
fined navigability for bed title purposes. See, e.g., Alabama: Hood v.
Murphy, 231 Ala. 404, 165 So. 219 (1936). Arizona: State v. Bonelli
Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971), aff'd on rehearing, 108
Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 313
(1973). Michigan: Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 462 (1953)
(dictum; Great Lakes); Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159
(1930) (Great Lakes and connectir)g waters); People ex rel. Gazlay v.
Murray, 54 Mich. App. 685, 221 N.W.2d 604 (1974) (Great Lakes). New
Mexico: State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51
N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) (dictum). Ohio: Cleveland Boat Serv. v.
City of Cleveland, 102 Ohio App. 255, 130 N.E.2d 421 (1955) (Great
Lakes); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 123.03 (Page 1978) (Great Lakes).
For state navigability definition cases, see notes 68-71 infra.
52. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 370-71, 374, 378 (1977); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 16,
rehearing denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381
(1891).
53. See Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452,460-61 (1903)
(Swamp Lands Act grant titles).
54. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
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bed following completion of a federal rechanneling project on
the Colorado River. Previously, that land had gradually disap-
peared by erosion. Both the abutting upland owner and the state
asserted title to the reemerged land. The Arizona Supreme
Court held that under state law the state had acquired title to
the riverbed as a result of the river's migration onto the ripar-
ian's land. The rechannelization was characterized as an avul-
sive change in the course of the river which did not affect bed
title.55
The United States Supreme Court admitted that the state
owned the riverbed prior to the rechannelization, but held that
the "equal footing" doctrine required that federal common law,
not state law, determine the location of title after statehood:
The present case ... does not involve a question of the disposition
of lands, the title to which is vested in the States as a matter of settled
federal law. The very question to be decided is the nature and extent
of the title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State under the
equal-footing doctrine .... In this case, the question of title as be-
tween the State and a private landowner necessarily depends on a
construction of a "right asserted under federal law."
The equal-footing doctrine was never intended to provide a State
with a windfall of thousands of acres of dry land exposed when the
main thread of a navigable stream is changed. It would be at odds with
the fundamental purpose of the original grant to the States to afford a
State title to land from which a navigable stream had receded unless
the land was exposed as part of a navigational or related public pro-
ject of which it was a necessary and integral part....
The advance of the Colorado's waters divested the title of the
upland owners in favor of the State in order to guarantee full public
enjoyment of the watercourse. But, when the water receded from the
land, there was no longer a public benefit to be protected; consequent-
ly, the State, as sovereign, has no need for title. That the cause of the
recession was artificial, or that the rate was perceptible, should be of
no effect.5 6
The Court held that under the federal common law the rechan-
neling project effected an artificial accretion; therefore, the
reemerged land belonged to the owner of the abutting fast
land .57
Bonelli caused consternation because it overruled the host
55. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,316-17 (1973). See State v. Bonelli
Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 469, 489 P.2d 699, 703 (1971).
For a discussion of accretion and avulsion, see Comment, Land Accre-
tion and Avulsion: The Battle of Blackbird Bend, 56 NFB. L. REV. 814
(1977).
56. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. at 320-24.
57. Id. at 327-28.
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of "equal footing" bed title precedent accumulated since the
early nineteenth century. Furthermore, it confused the sharp
line between the state's proprietary interest in title to beds of
navigable waters and its sovereign and police power interest in
protecting use of navigable waters by members of the public.5 8
It also confused the definitional distinction between avulsion
and accretion. 9
Within four years the Court again was faced with the same
factual and doctrinal questions. This time, in Oregon ex rel.
State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,6° title to a
portion of the bed of the Willamette River which was first oc-
cupied by the river after it suddenly changed its course during
the flood of 1909 was in dispute. Oregon asserted that bed title
follows the river. Corvallis asserted that the flood had caused an
avulsive change in the course of the river so that its prior title to
the area was not divested as a result of the inundation. The
Oregon Court of Appeals followed Bonelli and held that the
federal common law applied. Finding no need for state title to
the bed for public use purposes, the court held that an avulsion
had occurred and that Corvallis' prior title had not been di-
vested.61
In the United States Supreme Court, each party sought an
interpretation of the federal common law favorable to its posi-
tion. Amici argued that Bonelli was erroneous and that the
prior law should be restored. The Court agreed with amici and
overruled the federal common law extension of "equal-footing"
announced in Bonelli:
The title to the land underlying the Colorado River at the time
Arizona was admitted to the Union vested in the State as of that date
under the rule of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan.. . .Although federal law
may fix the initial boundary line between fast lands and the riverbeds
at the time of a State's admission to the Union, the State's title to the
riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is not
subject to later defeasance by operation of any doctrine of federal
common law....
58. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 18, at 4-8. The distinction between
navigability definitions also exists at the federal level. See notes 25-35 and
accompanying test supra.
59. See, e.g., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.26-.27 (A. Casner, ed. 1952); 7
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 983 (1977); Comment,
Land Accretion and Avulsion: The Battle of Blackbird Bend, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 814 (1977).
60. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
61. See State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 18 Or.
App. 524, 534-41, 526 P.2d 469, 474-77 (1974), aff'd & modified, 272 Or. 545,
536 P.2d 517, 538 P.2d 70 (1975); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1977).
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Bonelli's thesis that the equal-footing doctrine would require the
effect of a movement of the river upon title to the riverbed to be
resolved under federal common law was in error. Once the equal-
footing doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in Arizona as of the
time of its admission to the Union, the force of that doctrine was spent;
it did not operate after that date to determine what effect on titles the
movement of the river might have. Our error, as we now see it, was to
view the equal-footing doctrine enunciated in Pollard's Lessee v. Ha-
gan as a basis upon which federal common law could supersede state
law in the determination of land titles. Precisely the contrary is true;
in Pollard's Lessee itself the equal-footing doctrine resulted in the
State's acquisition of title notwithstanding the efforts of the Federal
Government to dispose of the lands in question in another way.
The equal-footing doctrine did not, therefore, provide a basis for
federal law to supersede the State's application of its own law in
deciding title to the Bonelli land .... Since the application of federal
common law is required neither by the equal-footing doctrine nor by
any other claim of federal right, we now believe that title to the Bonelli
land should have been governed by Arizona law, and that the disputed
ownership of the lands in the bed of the Willamette River in this case
should be decided solely as a matter of Oregon law.
6 2
Following its detailed examination of precedent, the Court
concluded that "[t]he rule laid down in Pollard's Lessee has
been followed in an unbroken line of cases which make it clear
that the title thus acquired [under the constitutionally mandated
'equal footing' doctrine] by the State is absolute so far as any
federal principle of land titles is concerned.
'8 3
The Court explained the error of its prior analysis of the
impact of the "equal footing" doctrine on bed titles:
The [Bonelli] approach would result in a perverse application of
the equal-footing doctrine. An original State would be free to choose
its own legal principles to resolve property disputes relating to land
under its riverbeds; a subsequently admitted State would be
constrained by the equal-footing doctrine to apply the federal
common law rule, which may result in property law determination
antithetical to the desires of that State.
64
The net result of the Court's reexamination of bed title law
was the conclusion that BoneIli "was wrong in treating the
equal-footing doctrine as a source of federal common law after
that doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in the State of
Arizona as of the time of its admission to the Union." 65 The
Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court for
examination of the case under state bed title law.
62. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
370-72 (1977).
63. Id. at 374.
64. Id. at 378.
65. Id. at 381.
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Corvallis completely restored the prior general rule that
once a state has acquired the beds of federally navigable waters
at statehood it has sole authority to determine the law governing
their disposition and that the federal government has no power
to divest either states or private title holders of any bed titles
conferred under the state law. 66 After Corvallis, there appears
to be no residual precedential value to Bonelli concerning in-
land waters.
67
D. State Navigability Definitions for Bed Title Purposes
A state may establish and use its own definitions of naviga-
bility to determine the location of title to beds of federally navig-
able waters acquired at statehood. This is a corollary of the
principle that a state may dispose of the beds of such waters in
any manner it chooses. The states created from federal ter-
ritories employ several different navigability definitions for bed
title purposes. A few states use the common law tidal definition
of navigability, 68 which in inland states prevents any water from
being characterized as navigable. A majority of states use a
definition similar or identical to the federal commercial naviga-
bility test.69 A large minority of states uses a definition which
66. See note 47 supra.
67. Maloney suggests that Bonelli may not have completely struck down the
federal common law of coastal frontage boundaries upheld in Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). See Maloney, supra note 12, at 485-88.
68. Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Oregon are states created
from federal territories which employ the tidal definition of navigability. In
these states, there are no inland navigable waters even though they may be
navigable in fact. See, e.g., Colorado: Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P.
685 (1905). Illinois: Leitch v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 369 Ill. 469, 17 N.E.2d
34 (1938). Mississippi: Wilson v. St. Regis Pulp & Paper Corp., 240 So. 2d 137
(Miss. 1970). Nebraska: Valder v. Wallis, 196 Neb. 222, 242 N.W.2d 112 (1976).
Oregon: Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625,56 P.2d 1158 (1936) (by implication;
tidal waters and large rivers).
69. Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming are states created from federal territories which define navigable
inland waters as those which are commercially used in trade and
commerce. See, e.g., Arkansas: Parker v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811,262 S.W.2d 891
(1953). California: People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448
(1971); City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460,52 P.2d 585 (1935).
Florida: Baker v. State ex rel. Jones, 87 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1956). Idaho: United
States v. Ladley, 4 F. Supp. 580 (D. Idaho 1933); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 P. 854 (1916). Indiana: State ex rel. Indiana Dep't of
Conservation v. Kivett, 228 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d 145 (1950). Iowa: State v.
Nichols, 241 Iowa 952, 44 N.W.2d 49 (1950) (by implication). Louisiana: Trans-
continental Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 209 La. 52, 24 So. 2d 248 (1946);
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Delacroix Corp., 285 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 1973).
Minnesota: State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957). Missouri:
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includes more streams, rivers, and lakes than does the federal
test. These more expansive definitions frequently are charac-
terized as sawlog or recreational boating tests.70 A few states
determine the navigability of particular watercourses by statute
or judicial decree without otherwise defining navigability. 71
Under those navigability definitions, some states grant the beds
of navigable waters to the owners of the abutting uplands.72
Others retain title to the beds of such waters.73
E. Beds of Federally Nonnavigable Inland Waters
The law concerning the location of title to beds of federally
nonnavigable inland waters in states created from federal ter-
ritories is not fully settled. Although the law concerning private
titles is clear, the law concerning state titles is open to question.
Clearly, the United States retains title to beds of all federally
nonnavigable inland waters when the state within which they lie
is admitted to the Union.74 The federal government may dispose
of those beds in any manner it chooses; it may expressly convey
such beds to private persons or to the state,75 or it may expressly
Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,269 S.W.2d 17 (1954). Montana: Gibson v. Kelly,
15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895). Nevada: State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros., 86 Nev.
872, 487 P.2d 159 (1970). Oklahoma: Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State, 200
Okla. 134, 191 P.2d 224 (1948). Tennessee: Tallassee Power Co. v. Clark, 77
F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1935) (by implication). Utah: Utah State Road Comm'n v.
Hardy Salt Co., 26 Utah 2d 143, 486 P.2d 391 (1971). Washington: Diking Dist.
No. 2 v. Calispel Duck Club, 11 Wash. 2d 131,118 P.2d 780 (1941); Knutson v.
Reichel, 10 Wash. App. 293, 518 P.2d 233 (1973). Wyoming: Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1971).
70. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin are states created from fed-
eral territories which employ a definition of navigability calling for
capability of floating sawlogs or recreational boats. See, e.g., North Dakota:
State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). South Dakota: Hillebrand v.
Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937). Wisconsin: Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
71. Kansas is a state created from a federal territory which designates particu-
lar inland waters to be navigable although they would not be navigable
under the commercial navigability definition. See, e.g., Wear v. Kansas ex
rel. Brewster, 245 U.S. 154 (1917) (judicial or statutory declaration); Jack-
son-Walker Coal & Material Co. v. Hodges, 283 F. 457 (D. Kan. 1918) (judi-
cial or statutory declaration); Webb v. Board of Comm'rs of Neosho
County, 124 Kan. 38, 257 P. 966 (1927) (judicial declaration).
72. See note 50 supra.
73. See note 51 supra.
74. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64, 75 (1931); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,
88 (1922) (by implication); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591-92, 594
(1922).
75. The federal government conveyed huge areas suitable for draining to the
states under the Swamp Lands Acts, 43 U.S.C. §§ 981-994 (1970). Most of the
beneficiary states lie within the Mississippi River and Great Lakes basins.
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reserve and retain them prior to or at the time of conveyance of
the abutting uplands. 6 In the absence of any such express ac-
tion, the law of federal land patents applies, which means that,
as a matter of federal law,77 interpretation of and incidents to
the title conveyed by the federal patent will be determined by
state law.78 Therefore, if the state rule gives bed title to the
owner of the abutting upland, the federal patent will carry such
bed title with it. 79 But if the state rule is that the state, not the
abutting upland owner, has title to the beds of federally non-
navigable inland waters, then the precedent is contradictory
and the result is unclear.
III. LOCATION OF TITLE TO BEDS OF FEDERALLY
NONNAVIGABLE INLAND WATERS WHICH ARE
CLAIMED BY THE STATES
The United States, not the individual states, probably retains
title to beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters in states
created from federal territories when the state law denies title to
the abutting upland owner and asserts state title. The abutting
upland owner does not acquire such bed titles. Although some
cases hold that the states have acquired such bed titles, the
better view is expressed by dicta in a few cases which suggest
that the United States has retained the bed titles.
The cases can be divided into three groups: (1) those holding
that the state has title to the beds of federally nonnavigable
inland waters; (2) those holding that the United States has re-
tained title; and (3) those leaving the question unresolved. None
of those groups of cases definitively answers the question of the
location of title to the beds.
See Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adja-
cent to Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 41.3(C), at 263-64 (R. Clark
ed. 1967).
76. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 25, 29 (1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922) (dictum).
77. See note 48 supra.
78. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 28 (1935) (dictum); Brewer-Elliott Oil &
Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,88 (1922) (dictum); Oklahoma v. Texas,
258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); Kean v.
Calumet Canal Co., 190 U.S. 452, 459 (1903); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,
384 (1891); Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 289 (1868).
79. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922); Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243, 263-64 (1913); Kean v. Calumet Canal Co., 190 U.S. 452,459 (1903);
Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Butler, 159 U.S. 87, 93-95 (1895). For state cases
placing title to the beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters in the
abutting upland owners, see note 152 infra.
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A. Cases Which Give Title to the States
The cases holding that the states created from federal ter-
ritories have title to the beds of federally nonnavigable inland
waters when the state law-so provides begin their analysis with
the general rule for the interpretation of federal land patents. If
the federal government has not shown any express intention to
convey the bed title or to reserve it, the United States is pre-
sumed in general to have assented that conveyance of that title
and its incidents should be construed and given effect according
to the rule of the state in which the land lies.80 The United States
Supreme Court described this general rule in Packer v. Bird:81
The courts of the United States will construe the grants of the general
government without reference to the rules of construction adopted by
the States for their grants; but whatever incidents or rights attach to
the ownership of property conveyed by the government will be deter-
mined by the States, subject to the condition that their rules do not
impair the efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of the
property by the grantee.
82
In the absence of express intention to the contrary, title to the
beds of federally nonnavigable waters will be conveyed accord-
ing to the local state rule regarding ownership of stream and
lake beds.83 This rule was best stated in Hardin v. Jordan:84
"IT]he grants of the government for lands bounded on streams
and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of
terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to the law
of the State in which the lands lie. '85
1. Hardin v. Shedd
The United States Supreme Court has held specifically that
the state can acquire title to the beds of federally nonnavigable
inland waters. The first and most important case so holding is
Hardin v. Shedd.86 Hardin sought to establish record title to the
bed of Wolf Lake from the State of Illinois under the Burnt
80. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77,88 (1922); Packer
v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891).
81. 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
82. Id. at 669.
83. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594 (1922); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508,
519 (1903); Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Butler, 159 U.S. 87, 92-94 (1895);
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669
(1891).
84. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
85. Id. at 384 (pursuant to the Illinois state law of that time, an owner of
abutting upland acquired title to center of navigable and nonnavigable
lakes).
86. 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
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Records Act. Shedd claimed the bed as successor in title to the
upland patentee. The lake was nonnavigable under both the
federal and state definitions. Illinois law at that time provided
that the beds of all lakes, navigable and nonnavigable, belonged
to the state. In confirming Hardin's title from the state, the
Court stated:
In the case of land bounded on a nonnavigable lake the United States
assumes the position of a private owner subject to the general law of
the State, so far as its conveyances are concerned. .. . The rule as to
conveyances bounded on non-navigable lakes does not mean that the
land under such water ... passed to the State on its admission or
otherwise,.. . but is simply a convenient, possibly the most conven-
ient, way of determining the effect of a grant.
8 7
2. Kansas Cases
In a later case, the Court refused to upset a determination by
the Kansas Supreme Court that the Kansas River was navigable
in law at Topeka and that, as a result, the bed of the river
belonged to the state.88 Two lower federal courts followed that
decision and refused to upset Kansas's later assertions of title.
8 9
In one of these cases, the district court commented:
[T]here can be no possible doubt whatever the Arkansas River at the
point in controversy in this case is not now, and has not, since its
known history, been navigable in point of fact .... However ... it
must. . . be held, in this case, the navigability of the stream in point of
fact is not the true test. On the contrary, the true test is whether the
Arkansas River at the locus in quo must be regarded as navigable
under the local laws of the state of Kansas, as ordained and estab-
lished for the purpose of the unvarying determination of the property
rights of riparian owners along its course through the state. That by
the local property rule established in this state, once for all, the title to
the bed of the Arkansas River within the state is vested in the state and
not in the adjoining riparian owner.90
3. Discussion
In each of these cases the state did not receive title to the bed
of the federally nonnavigable inland water by a grant from the
United States; instead, there was no expression of federal inten-
tion whatever. In each of these cases the court held that the state
acquired title to the bed by operation of the federal land patent
interpretation rule by reference to the local state bed title rule
87. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903) (citations omitted).
88. Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154, 157 (1917).
89. Shore v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 60 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1932); Jackson-Walker
Coal & Material Co. v. Hodges, 283 F. 457 (D. Kan. 1918).
90. Jackson-Walker Coal & Material Co. v. Hodges, 283 F. 457,464-65 (D. Kan.
1918) (citations omitted).
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when the abutting upland was granted to individual patentees
by the United States. The only way by which the states could
have received that bed title is by implied grant.
One other factor should be noted about all of these cases-
the United States was not a party. Each of the bed title disputes
was between the state and the private owner of the abutting fast
land. The validity of the title of the United States vis a vis the
state's title was not being litigated.
B. Cases Which Give Title to the United States
There are several cases which expressly hold that the federal
government, not the individual states, holds title to the beds of
federally nonnavigable inland waters in states created from
federal territories even though the state rule confers title on the
state. However, none of these decisions can be regarded as
squarely holding that a state cannot acquire bed title by opera-
tion of law. In each of these cases, retention of title by the United
States can be explained more simply and directly on other
grounds.
1. Oklahoma v. Texas
The first of these cases is Oklahoma v. Texas.9 1 Oklahoma
claimed title to the bed of the Red River where oil and gas had
been found. The United States intervened to assert title in its
own right and as trustee for Indians whose land lay on the
Oklahoma shore. The private shore owners also intervened. (A
previous decision had held that the Texas boundary ran along
the south bank of the river so its claims were not involved in this
part of the case.)
Oklahoma claimed title to the entire bed of the river because
the river was declared navigable in law under state court deci-
sions and under a state statute. Therefore, it argued that the bed
had passed to it upon its admission to statehood. The United
States claimed the south half of the bed, asserting that (1) the
river was not navigable in fact under the federal test, (2) the
beds of nonnavigable waters did not pass to the state upon its
admission to the Union, and (3) the common law of Oklahoma
conveyed the bed to the upland owners only as far as the middle
of the stream. The United States, as trustee for the Indians, and
private upland owners claimed portions of the north half of the
bed as riparian upland owners.9 2
91. 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
92. Id. at 583, 591, 594-96.
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After finding the Red River to be nonnavigable under the
federal definition, the Court made its landmark pronouncement
that title to beds of nonnavigable waters is retained by the
federal government after the state is admitted to the Union:
We conclude that no part of the river within Oklahoma is navigable
and therefore that the title to the bed did not pass to the State on its
admission into the Union. If the State has a lawful claim to any part of
the bed, it is only such as may be incidental to its ownership of ripa-
rian lands on the northerly bank.
93
Finding that there was no intention by the United States to
separate the bed from the upland, the Court followed the rule of
land patent interpretation laid down in Hardin v. Jordan94 and
looked to the property law of Oklahoma to determine the dis-
posal of the bed.
Oklahoma argued that the common law rule had been im-
pliedly abrogated by the Oklahoma legislature when it declared
the Red River to be navigable, and that beds of rivers declared
navigable under the state definition belonged to the state as do
the beds of tidal rivers under the common law. The Court reject-
ed this argument stating that the Oklahoma statute in question
was addressed to public use rights to the water and not to
ownership of the bed. "The rule as to either could be displaced
without affecting the other. ' '9 5
The Court, therefore, applied the common law rule, which
provides that the bed of a nonnavigable stream to the medial
line, but not beyond, is conveyed with the upland.96 The Court
held that the United States owned the south half of the bed and
93. Id. at 591-92.
94. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
95. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 596.
96. In a recent case involving the common law of Oklahoma, a lower federal
court held that where the entire bed of a nonnavigable stream is in one
state which borders on the river, the entire bed is attached to the upland
tracts in that state.
When... the grantor owns the entire bed of the stream, but no part
of the upland on the opposite side, in the absence of a clear indica-
tion of a contrary intention from the terms of the grant and the
attendant circumstances, the grant will be construed to convey to
the grantee the entire bed of the stream.
The rule is bottomed on two reasons: (1) A grantor will be pre-
sumed not to have reserved a strip of land covered by water, which
would be of little practical value to him; (2) It is a wise public policy,
to prevent vexatious litigation likely to arise from retention of title
to the river bed in the grantor, on the happening of some unex-
pected event.
Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seay, 235 F.2d 30, 35 (10th Cir. 1956).
Query, was the Supreme Court or the circuit court in error about the
common law of Oklahoma? The answer will not affect the analysis of
Oklahoma v. Texas.
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the upland proprietors the north half. Since the Court ruled that
the property law of Oklahoma did not convey the bed of a river
which was nonnavigable under the federal definition to the
state but rather to the upland patentee, and since the United
States retained ownership of the south half of that bed under
that same common law, Oklahoma v. Texas cannot be
construed as a decision overruling the implied grant line of
cases following Hardin v. Shedd.97 Rather it must be considered
as another case supporting the general rule of state law in-
terpretation of federal patents announced in Hardin v.
Jordan.98
2. Two Later Cases
Two later cases have held that the federal definition must be
used to determine navigability for the purpose of deciding
whether the bed was transferred to the state upon admission to
the Union or was retained by the United States. 9 The common
law of these states gives title to the beds of nonnavigable waters
to the upland proprietor, which in these cases was the United
States. This is the correct result under Hardin v. Jordan.
3. United States v. Oregon
The most recent case is United States v. Oregon.10 Professor
Bade asserts'01 that United States v. Oregon stands for the
proposition that a state cannot become owner of the bed of a
nonnavigable water under the federal definition by virtue of
grants of the upland to individual patentees. He argues that
there is a limitation to the general rule of Hardin v. Jprdan,10 2
97. 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
98. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
99. In United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), the Court held that portions of
the Colorado River were not navigable under the federal definition and
that title to the beds of those portions remained in the United States after
Utah was admitted to the Union. Id. at 83. Utah did not allege a property
rule making the beds of nonnavigable rivers property of the state. The
United States was the upland proprietor on both sides of the river.
In United States v. Ladley, 4 F. Supp. 580 (D. Idaho 1933), the district
court held that a lake was nonnavigable under the federal definition, that
the United States had retained ownership of the bed after Idaho's admis-
sion to the Union, and that the United States owned the bed as upland
proprietor, as trustee for the Indians. Id. at 583-84. Idaho did not assert a
property rule making it the owner of the beds of nonnavigable waters.
100. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
101. Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REv. 305
(1940).
102. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
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that the local state property rule concerning incidents of own-
ership should be followed in the absence of contrary evidence of
intention by the federal government. Hence, if the local state
rule provides that the upland owner shall not obtain title to the
bed of a nonnavigable water under the state definition, then its
title remains in the United States.
10 3
The contention that the Hardin v. Jordan rule does not
comprehend conveyance of the bed of a nonnavigable water to
the state by operation of law when the upland is patented must
come from the following language in United States v. Oregon:
[Iln no case has this Court held that a state could deprive the United
States of its title to land under non-navigable waters without its
consent, or that a grant of uplands to private individuals, which does
not in terms or by implication include the adjacent land under water,
nevertheless operates to pass it to the State....
The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title
to its lands. The States are powerless to place any limitation or restric-
tion on that control ...
The State, in making its present contention, does not claim as a
grantee designated or named in any grant of the United States. It
points to no rule ever recognized or declared by the courts of the State
that a grant to individual upland proprietors impliedly grants to the
State the adjacent land under water. . . . The case is not one of the
reasonable construction of grants of the United States, but the at-
tempted forfeiture to the State by legislative fiat of lands which, as far
as they have not passed to the individual upland proprietors, remain
the property of the United States.10
4
A close reading of United States v. Oregon reveals that it
does not support Professor Bade's assertion. The United States
brought an action against Oregon to quiet title to the bed of
Malheur Lake and four other bodies of water located within
surveyed meander lines. The United States claimed that the
beds were its property because the lakes were nonnavigable in
fact under the federal definition and the beds had never been
disposed of. Oregon asserted ownership to the beds on two
grounds: (1) the lakes were navigable and, therefore, the beds of
the lakes had passed to it upon its admission to the Union, and
(2) the beds passed to it by operation of law when the upland
was conveyed either to the individual patentees or to the state as
school or indemnity lands."0 5 For the latter assertion, Oregon
relied on the Hardin v. Jordan rule and upon a 1921 state statute
declaring that lakes meandered by public surveys were navi-
gable public waters and title to beds of such lakes was in the
state.106
103. Bade, supra note 101, at 317-18 (quoted at note 124 infra).
104. 295 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935).
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. at 7.
BED OWNERSHIP
It was not necessary for the Court to state that the bed of
nonnavigable inland water is not impliedly conveyed to the
State since the Court stated three other reasons for its decision.
First, the 1921 Oregon statute, which repudiated the common
law "ad mediumfilum aquae" rule and declared the title of beds
of meandered lakes to be in the state, was enacted subsequent to
all of the conveyances of the upland and constituted an ex post
facto taking of property. Second, the statute operated as an
unlawful forfeiture to the state of bed title attached to uplands
retained by the United States 10 7 in violation of the constitutional
power of the United States to regulate its own property. Third,
there were no facts to support an intent by the United States to
abandon or surrender any part of the lake bed.10 8 Therefore, the
Court followed the "express intention" exception stated in Har-
din v. Jordan and did not rely on the general rule of state law
interpretation of federal patents.
The third basis for decision was applied backwards by the
Court, for Hardin v. Jordan requires a positive indication of
intent to reserve the bed of a navigable water by the United
States in order to take the case out of the general rule. The fact
that the United States established a bird reserve on the lake bed
in 1908, merely thirteen years after the survey, could be con-
sidered to be sufficient positive indication to negate application
of the general rule.10 9 Therefore, United States v. Oregon does
not reject the rules of construction of federal grants announced
in Hardin v. Jordan, but, in fact, supports and follows them.
Since the case decided that the Oregon statute which de-
clared that state title to the b'eds of meandered lakes can have
no effect either on private titles established prior to 1921 or on
title to lands never patented by the United States, United States
v. Oregon cannot be said to address itself directly to the ques-
tion whether a State can by operation of law acquire title to the
bed of a water it declares to be navigable when the upland is
conveyed to an individual patentee. Nonetheless, United States
107. Id. at 28-29.
108. Id. at 28.
109. This third ground for rejecting Oregon's assertion of title appears to be
weak factually. In United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1942), the
United States sought to quiet title to the lake bed against the shoreland
patentees on Malheur Lake. The court of appeals found title in the pat-
entees since it found not only no intention by the United States to reserve
the bed, but also a positive intention as early as 1895 to convey the bed with
the upland. Id. at 996-98. Such an intention would also apply to the upland
which the United States had never sold. Since it owned 80 percent of the
abutting fast lands, the United States would retain title to that portion of
the bed as a private proprietor under the Oregon common and statutory
law in effect prior to 1921.
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v. Oregon is strongly indicative of the Court's attitude on this
question.
4. Discussion
In none of the cases giving bed title to the United States did
the states have a local property rule at the time the uplands were
patented which stated either that the bed of a nonnavigable
inland water was the property of the state or that the bed was
conveyed to the state by operation of law when the upland was
granted to the individual patentee. In two cases, the state had a
different definition for navigability than the federal definition,
but one was held to apply only to water use rights and not to bed
title,1 10 and the other was held to cause an unlawful ex post
facto divestiture of property."' As a result, the courts applied
the general rule of construction announced in Hardin v. Jor-
dan112 (which uses the local state rule of property as a guide to
determine the disposition of incidents of ownership of the up-
land) and attached title to the bed of the nonnavigable inland
waters to the upland. In some cases the upland title holder was
an individual patentee; in others it was the United States. The
rule announced by Hardin v. Shedd 113 (that the bed is conveyed
to the state by operation of law when the upland is conveyed to
an individual patentee) was neither discussed nor applied in
these cases.
C. Cases Which Leave the Location of Title in Doubt
1. Marshall Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa
There is only one federal case which recognized that giving
states created from federal territories title to the beds of feder-
ally nonnavigable inland waters when the upland is patented
involves an implied grant by the United States. In Marshall
Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa,"4 the company, owner of
the entire shoreland of Goose Lake, sought to drain the lake. It
claimed title through the State of Iowa and Greene County
under the Swamp Lands Acts 15 and a state statute conveying
swamplands to the counties. Iowa sought to enjoin the drainage
and to quiet title, basing its claim on a state law giving title to
110. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
111. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
112. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
113. 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
114. 226 U.S. 460 (1913).
115. Swamp Lands Acts, 43 U.S.C. §§ 981-994 (1970).
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beds of meandered lakes to the state. The lake had been mean-
dered as a lake in an 1853 public survey. A request by the state
in 1903 to have it surveyed as swamplands was refused by the
Secretary of the Interior because there was insufficient proof
that it was not a lake. Accepting a state court decision that the
lake was nonnavigable but proper to be meandered,116 the Court
refused to give title to the upland owner:
By the law of Iowa the riparian owners took title only to the water's
edge, and therefore the grants of the adjoining land by the United
States did not convey the land under the lake.. . . It follows that the
bed of the lake either still belongs to the United States or must be held
to have passed to the State."
7
The Court held that Iowa had a sufficient interest in the lakebed
to maintain suit against an intruder without title. Therefore, it
was not necessary to decide whether title was in Iowa or in the
116. State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 122 N.W. 241 (1909).
117. Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 461 (1913).
The Iowa Supreme Court below raised the same issue and also declined
to resolve it because it was not necessary to the decision:
What becomes of the title to the bed of the lake when the riparian
owner takes to the water's edge only? Is it retained by the United
States, or does it pass to the state in which the body of water is
located? . . . If title is within the state, when and how was it ac-
quired?...
Prior to the admission of Iowa as a state the title to this lake bed
was in the United States, and it was not thereby divested....
... Manifestly nonnavigable waters are not within [the equal
footing] doctrine, and upon what theory it may be said that title to
the beds of nonnavigable lakes pass from the (federal] government
to the state upon its admission to the Union, courts so holding have
not taken the trouble to explain.
... There seems no ground for saying that the state acquired
title to the nonnavigable lakes upon admission of the state to the
Union.... The conclusion is unavoidable that the [federal] gov-
ernment, in reserving the numerous small [meandered] lakes of the
state from sale, intended them for the public use. No attention has
been bestowed thereon since by the [federal] government, and in all
respects, save in the regulation of commerce, nonnavigable lakes
like those which are navigable, have been treated as under the
control and sovereignty of the state.
State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 403-07, 122 N.W. 241, 242-44 (1909) (citations
omitted).
In concluding that the state had authority to designate the boundary of
lands abutting upon meandered nonnavigable lakes at the water's edge and
to bring actions to restrain the abutting owners from adversely affecting
the waters of the lakes, the Iowa court commented:
We are not now concerned with the inquiry as to whether the state
may dispose of these lake beds in a manner inimicable to the
purposes of their reservation by the general government. It is
enough to dispose of the case at bar to decide ... that the state has
such an interest in Goose Lake as will support an action to restrain
defendants, who are without title, from draining the waters there-
from, or otherwise exercising proprietary control over the same.
Id. at 409, 122 N.W. at 244.
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United States. That disclaimer is significant because it recog-
nized the paramount fact existing in all the cases in which the
state asserted title to the beds of federally nonnavigable wa-
ters-that the United States was not a party and that the validity
of its title vis a vis the state's was not being litigated.
Great weight should be given the comment in Marshall Den-
tal Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa that when the local state proper-
ty rule gives title to the bed of a nonnavigable inland water to
the state, and not to the upland patentee, it means only that the
upland owner does not obtain title to the bed; it does not deter-
mine whether the state obtains title instead or whether the
United States retains title. The cases giving title to the state
should be viewed as deciding only that the state has better title
than the upland owner, but not that the state necessarily has
better title than the United States. Instead, the dictum in United
States v. Oregon,118 which repudiated a rule divesting property
of the United States by operation of state law, should apply.
2. State Cases
A few state courts have recognized the problem of resolving
how the state could acquire title to the beds of federally non-
navigable inland waters. Three Iowa decisions suggested in dic-
ta that title to the beds must have remained in the United States'
but held that a determination of the location of bed title was
unnecessary to the question whether the state could restrain
private upland owners from adversely affecting the waters in
meandered nonnavigable lakes.119 A Wisconsin decision found it
118. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
119. The earliest Iowa decision is State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 122 N.W. 241
(1909). See note 117 supra. The second is State v. Livingston, 164 Iowa 31,
145 N.W. 91 (1914), in which the state sought to quiet title to the bed of Boyer
Lake, a meandered nonnavigable lake, the bed of which had been drained
by the upland owners. The state based its claim on the doctrine of State v.
Jones:
In State v. Jones ... this court has recognized the right of the state
to maintain action to prevent persons without title from exercising
a proprietary interest over a lake or lake bed, the theory of the
decision being that the title to the bed of a nonnavigable mean-
dered lake does not pass to the owners of platted lands bordering
upon it, but, in the absence of conveyance by patent, remains in the
general government, reserved in trust for all the people of the state
in which it lies. Upon this rule plaintiff rests its right to sue.
164 Iowa at 36-37, 145 N.W. at 93. The court quieted title in the upland
owners because it found that the beds were under a river, not a lake, and
that title to the beds of nonnavigable rivers belonged to the upland owners.
The third decision is State v. Nichols, 241 Iowa 952, 44 N.W.2d 49 (1950),
in which the state sought to quiet title to the bed of a lake which had been
patented after the General Land Office determined that it had been mean-
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unnecessary to make such a determination about the bed of a
drained nonnavigable lake in a quiet title action brought suc-
cessfully by the upland owner against the patentee of the
drained lake bed.120 A Minnesota decision referred to the issue,
but did not reach it because it held that the state could assert
title only to the beds of federally navigable waters.121
D. Discussion
No case to date has held squarely whether a state created
from a federal territory can acquire title to the bed of a federally
dered by mistake and was available for entry and purchase. Besides hold-
ing that such a determination could not be challenged collaterally by the
state, the court commented that the state need not depend on a determina-
tion that the lake was navigable for its right to maintain the action. It noted
that under Iowa law the beds of meandered nonnavigable lakes do not
belong to the upland owners. On the question whether the state could
maintain an action to restrain the upland owners from exercising proprie-
tary rights over the lake beds, the court quoted State v. Jones and State v.
Livingston, and commented, "The state may take such action as may seem
necessary to protect and preserve such a lake, and while it is not necessary
to pass upon the question, and we do not, it is a pertinent inquiry whether
the state could ever quiet title to such a lake." 241 Iowa at 968,44 N.W.2d at
58.
120. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Boorman v. Sunnuchs, 42 Wis. 233,
246 (1877):
The exigencies of the case do not require us to determine whether
the United States or the state of Wisconsin is the owner of that
portion of the bed of the pond to which the plaintiff may fail to
establish title. The question is an important one, and not free from
difficulty, but it is immaterial to the determination of this case. The
plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed in respect to the lands in
controversy to which he establishes title in himself, and no further.
Failing to show title in himself, he fails in the action, and it is of no
consequence whether the title is in the defendant under his patent
from the United States, or in the state, notwithstanding the patent.
121. The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 552, 556,
89 N.W.2d 661, 682, 685 (1957), twice referred to the state bed title issue
without either introduction or analysis. First, the court quoted United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935) (language quoted in the text at note
104 supra). Second, it quoted from Professor Bade's article, supra note 101,
at 317 (language quoted at note 126 infra). Both quotations were gratuitous
since neither was necessary to the decision in the case. However, the state
bed title question would have to have been decided if the court had ac-
cepted the state's assertion of title and rejected the upland owner's titles.
The state had argued that its recreational boating navigability test deter-
mined which beds of federally nonnavigable lakes belonged to the private
upland owners and which belonged to the state. Since the court decided
that the federal navigability test not only determined which lake beds the
state acquired at statehood under the equal footing rule but also decided
that the beds of all federally nonnavigable lakes belonged to the private
upland owners, the state bed title question was rendered moot. Therefore,
the court concluded that the state had no proprietorship over the beds of
several northern lakes, the draining of which it sought to license for iron
ore mining purposes.
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nonnavigable inland water by implied grant or operation of law
when the upland is patented by the United States to a private
individual. The cases which held that the states do acquire bed
title applied the general rule announced in Hardin v. Jordan
that incidents to the title conferred by the patent will be inter-
preted by the law of the state in which the bed is located. None
of those cases considered the implied grant problem. In none of
them was the United States a party. The cases which held that
the United States retains bed title where the state law denies
title to the upland owners did consider the implied grant prob-
lem, either expressly or impliedly. However, in none of these
cases did the state have a rule at the time the upland was pat-
ented that the state acquired bed title. Those cases were decided
on other grounds.
The state bed title issue has existed ever since the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hardin v.
Shedd,122 in which state title to the bed of Wolf Lake in Illinois, a
federally nonnavigable lake, was confirmed and title in the up-
land owner was rejected. Two justices dissented in that case on
the ground that to give the state the title to the bed was to cause
an appropriation of property of the United States.
Hardin v. Jordan. . . , whilst recognizing that the ownership of the
beds of non-navigable lakes on the public domain was in the United
States, simply decided that when the United States sold lots bordering
on such a lake the question whether or not the bed of the lake passed
by the grant of the border lots was to be determined by the principles
of conveyancing in force under the local law of the State where the
lake was situated. Now, as the settled rule in Illinois is that under the
principles of conveyancing prevailing in that State no title to the bed
of a lake passes to the patentees of the United States by the sale of
border lots, I do not perceive how the United States has been divested
of its title to the bed of Wolf Lake. To say that, although on the
principles of conveyancing under the local law, the bed did not pass,
nevertheless, because the United States sold the border lots, the State
of Illinois thereby became the owner of the bed of the lake, is, as I
understand it, to declare that it is in the power of the State of Illinois to
appropriate the property of the United States.123
Nonetheless, with the exception of the Iowa and Wisconsin deci-
sions, the state bed title issue was not recognized by any state or
federal court in concrete terms until the 1935 decision in United
States v. Oregon.2 4 That decision was not determinative, al-
though highly suggestive of the Court's attitude. Subsequently,
no federal court and no state courts, except those in Iowa and
Minnesota, have dealt with the issue. By contrast a few state
courts since 1935 have held that the state does acquire title to the
122. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
123. Id. at 522-23.
124. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
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beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters when the upland
is patented to private individuals. 125 Therefore, the question
cannot be considered settled.
Commentators generally agree that the United States does
retain title to the beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters
in states created from federal territories where state law denies
title to the upland owners and purports to place it in the state. 121
125. See, e.g., Grape v. Laiblin, 181 Kan. 677, 314 P.2d 335 (1957); Statev. Brace,
76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949); State v. McDonald Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d
173, 118 N.W.2d 152 (1962) (lake).
126. Professor Bade was the first to argue that the United States retains title to
the beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters where state law denies
such title to the upland owners. Relying on United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935) (quoted in text accompanying note 104 supra), Bade
states:
The United States retained the full proprietary powers over all
parts of the public domain which did not pass to the state ... and
which had not been previously disposed of.
Since the United States retained the beds of non-navigable wa-
ters (non-navigable according to the federal test applied at the time
the state was admitted), it may dispose of those beds as it sees
fit.... If the beds of non-navigable waters do not pass with a grant
of the adjacent upland, then they remain in the United States. The
state cannot claim to become the owner of the beds of such non-
navigable waters by virtue of grants of the abutting upland to
individual patentees.
Bade, supra note 101, at 317-18. See also id. at 323.
Harold Ellis and his colleagues twice have examined the question. They
first discussed the issue in a study of Illinois water law:
It would appear ... that the federal courts, unless a contrary
intention was manifested in a federal patent or grant, ordinarily
may construe such patents or grants issued after statehood to lands
bordering on meandered Illinois lakes that are not navigable (by
federal criteria) in conformity with the general rule followed by
Illinois courts that the grantee did not thereby acquire title to the
bed of such a lake. But it would seem that federal courts also might
hold that the ownership of the beds of such lakes is in the federal
government, not the State of Illinois, on the ground that it retained
title to land not conveyed .... The state, while acquiring title to
the beds of navigable waters upon statehood, did not acquire title
to beds of nonnavigable waters.
F. MANN, H. ELLIS & N. KRAusz, WATER-USE LAW IN ILLINOIS 95-96 (1964).
See id. at 91-95 (extensive analysis of the cases). The authors point out that
one effect of federal retained title might be the necessity to obtain a federal
license for construction of a structure in the bed of a federally nonnaviable
inland water. Id. at 94 n.38a.
Ellis and his colleagues examined the question again in a study of
Wisconsin water law:
It would appear . . . that federal law regarding bed ownership
ordinarily would allow a state's rules [about bed ownership] to be
applied so as to preclude the grantees under federal patents or
grants after statehood from acquiring title to the bed .... If a lake
were non-navigable by the federal test of navigability, the state
would not have obtained title to its bed upon statehood ....
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An analysis of the existing law indicates that the United States
retains title in the absence of express grant. The analysis starts
with the proposition, previously discussed, that upon its admis-
sion to the Union, a state acquires title only to the beds of waters
which are then navigable under the federal test.'2 7 Title to the
beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters is retained by the
United States.128 Subsequent to statehood, the federal govern-
ment may convey the beds by express grant or patent, either to
private individuals or to the state.129 In addition, under the fed-
eral law incorporating the state's rules concerning incidents to
title, title to such beds may pass to the patentees of uplands by
operation of federal law.130 Therefore, all beds of federally non-
navigable inland waters not disposed of by express or implied
grant continue to be owned by the United States.
Since there usually is not an express grant to the state of the
beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters when the upland
is patented to private individuals, the only way the state could
acquire title to such beds is by implied grant or operation of law.
Many state courts have assumed without discussion that title
[I]t would appear that to the extent that riparian grantees
under federal patents or grants did not acquire title to the beds of
non-navigable lakes by federal criteria, the federal courts might
hold that the ownership is in the federal government, not the state
of Wisconsin, on the ground that the federal government retained
title to the land not [sic] conveyed. They especially might so hold in
any case in which the federal government is a party and asserts its
interests, as it did in United States v. Oregon.
H. ELLIS, J. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD & J. DEBRAAL, supra note 28, at 64, 66
(footnotes omitted). They reiterate the proposition that federal licenses
may be required for structures erected in the beds of federally nonnavi-
gable inland water and suggest further that dredging and mineral licenses
might be similarly required. Id. at 67.
Wells Hutchins more recently examined the state bed title question in
his treatise on western water law and reached the same conclusion:
Where waters are not navigable in fact at the time of establish-
ment of a new State, title of the United States to land underlying
them remains unaffected by the change to statehood.
In no case has the United States Supreme Court held that a
State can deprive the United States of its title to lands underlying
nonnavigable waters without its consent, or that a grant of uplands
to private individuals, which does not in terms or by implication
include the adjacent land under water, nevertheless operates to
pass it to the State.
1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 134-
35 (completed by H. Ellis & J. DeBrall, U.S. Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No.
1206, 1971).
127. See note 13 supra.
128. See note 74 supra.
129. See note 75 supra.
130. See note 79 supra.
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passes to the state in that manner.131 But title should not pass to
the state in that manner since implied grants against the
sovereign never are presumed.
Only federal laws, not the laws of the individual states, can
control the disposition of lands owned by the United States.
United States v. Oregon made that clear in the bed title
context.132 The federal courts long have held that the interpreta-
tion of federal land patents is a matter of federal law, not state
law, 33 and have stated that it is federal policy to incorporate
state title interpretation rules by reference in order to create a
uniformity of title law in each state.134
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court, in Hardin v.
Shedd,135 and many state courts have recognized state title to
beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters. 136 The Supreme
Court has justified that position by arguing that after statehood,
the federal government is nothing more than a private proprie-
tor of retained beds.137 Since the United States no longer has
sovereign prerogatives over its own property under this view,
the states can determine the location of title to the beds and can
place that title in themselves.
That view is unsupportable. The United States Supreme
Court has indicated subsequent to Hardin v. Shedd that the
federal government retains sovereign prerogatives over re-
tained public domain which the states are powerless to affect.
When presented with the question whether a state could deter-
mine the nature of water rights attached to public domain lands
after statehood, the Court stated:
If it be conceded that in the absence of federal legislation the state
would be powerless to affect the riparian rights of the United States or
its grantees, still, the authority of Congress to vest such power in the
state, and that it has done so by the [Desert Land Act of 1877], cannot
be doubted. 38
The Court found that Congress had expressly granted the pow-
er to determine water use rights on public domain lands by that
legislation. However, neither Congress nor the federal courts
have granted to the states analogous power to determine the
131. See notes 16 and 24 supra.
132. 295 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935). See note 104 supra.
133. See note 48 supra.
134. Id.
135. 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
136. See notes 16 and 24 supra.
137. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903).
138. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
162 (1935).
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location of title to beds of federally nonnavigable inland waters
in states created from federal territories where state law denies
it to the upland proprietors. Therefore, the Court's statement
strongly suggests that the states have no power to affect the
federal title to the beds. The statement assumes that the United
States retains its sovereign prerogatives over the beds as part of
the public domain.
Another reason the states do not acquire title to the beds of
federally nonnavigable inland waters when the upland is pat-
ented also stems from the sovereign rights of the United States
over the public domain. Title to lands owned by the sovereign
are not transferred to a grantee by implication, but only by
express grant or affirmative operation of law. The sovereign is
presumed to have retained title to all lands not expressly grant-
ed. Federal courts have recognized that principle with respect to
public domain lands and federal purchased lands in general 139
and with respect to beds of federally nonnavigable waters in
particular. 140 State courts have recognized the same principle
with respect to state public lands.4 1 Furthermore, grants by the
sovereign are construed against the grantee; ambiguities are
resolved in favor of the sovereign grantor. 142 The Supreme
Court has also stated that states do not have power to divest the
United States of title to its lands, 143 including beds of federally
nonnavigable inland waters. 144 Therefore, the conclusion is ines-
capable that in states created from federal territories the beds
of federally nonnavigable inland waters retained by the United
States at statehood, and neither expressly granted nor impliedly
conveyed with patents to the abutting uplands by affirmative
operation of law, must still be owned by the United States.
E. States in Which the Bed Title Problem Exists
The question whether a state created from a federal territory
can acquire title to the beds of federally nonnavigable inland
waters by implied grant exists only in a few states. The question
can arise under only two combinations of state bed title rules.
The first combination consists of a navigability definition more
139. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 89 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 10 (1893); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672-73 (1891) (by implication);
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) *367, *411 (1842).
140. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 25, 27-28 (1935).
141. Strayhorn v. Jones, 157 Tex. 136, 300 S.W.2d 623 (1957).
142. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 89 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 10 (1893); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) *367, *411 (1842).
143. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) *498, *516-17 (1839) (upland).
144. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) (by implication).
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extensive than the federal commercial navigability definition 145
and an assertion of state title to the beds of those navigable
inland waters.146 The states using this combination are Kansas,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 147 The second
combination consists of a navigability definition equivalent to
or more restrictive than the federal definition 148 and an asser-
tion of state title to beds of certain of the nonnavigable inland
waters. 49 The states using this combination are Illinois, Iowa,
and possibly Oregon. 50 The state bed title question cannot arise
in any state which has a combination of rules whereby the state
has a navigability definition equivalent to or more restrictive
than the federal definition' 5' and title to beds of nonnavigable
inland waters is placed in the abutting upland owners. 152 States
145. For states which have such definitions, see notes 70 and 71 supra.
146. For states which assert state title over state navigable inland waters, see
note 51 supra.
147. See notes 51(3) and (4) supra; appendix infra.
148. For states which have such definitions, see notes 68 and 69 supra.
149. Illinois, Iowa, and Oregon assert state title over beds of certain nonnavi-
gable inland waters. See, e.g., Illinois: Wilton v. Van Hessen, 249 Ill. 182, 94
N.E. 134 (1911) (dictum) (meandered); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, § 71 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1977) (meandered lakes). Iowa: Carr v. Moore, 119 Iowa 152, 93
N.W. 52 (1903) (meandered). Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430 (1975) (mean-
dered lakes). But see United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
150. See notes 51(1)-(2) and 148 supra; appendix infra. -
151. For states which have such definitions, see notes 68 and 69 supra.
152. States created from federal territories which transfer title to beds of non-
navigable inland waters to the abutting upland owners fall into five groups
(Alaska has no bed title cases).
1. Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Oregon employ the
tidal definition of navigability to designate inland waters as non-
navigable although navigable in fact. See, e.g., Colorado: Hartman v.
Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905). Illinois: Leitch v. Sanitary Dist.,
369 Ill. 469, 17 N.E.2d 34 (1938) (except meandered waters; see note
157 supra). Mississippi: Wilson v. St. Regis Pulp & Paper Corp., 240 So.
2d 137 (Miss. 1970). Nebraska: Valder v. Wallis, 196 Neb. 222, 242
N.W.2d 112 (1976). Oregon: Belmont v. Umpqua Sand & Gravel, Inc.,
273 Or. 581, 542 P.2d 884 (1975). OR. REv. STAT. § 93.310(4) (1975)
(except, query, meandered lakes; see note 149 supra).
2. Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming employ the commercial navigability defi-
nition of navigability. See, e.g., Arkansas: Gill v. Porter, 248 Ark. 140,
450 S.W.2d 306 (1970). California: Bishel v. Faria, 53 Cal. 2d 254, 347
P.2d 289, 1 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1959); CAL. Civ. CODE § 830 (West 1954).
Florida: South Venice Corp. v. Caspersen, 229 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App.
1969). Idaho: United States v. Ladley, 4 F. Supp. 580 (D. Idaho 1933);
A.B. Moss & Bro. v. Ramey, 25 Idaho 1, 136 P. 608 (1913), aff'd, 239
U.S. 538 (1916). Indiana: State ex rel. Indiana Dep't of Conservation v.
Kivett, 228 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d 145 (1950). Iowa: Simpson v. Iowa State
Highway Comm'n, 195 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1972) (except meandered
waters; see note 149 supra). Louisiana: Begnaud v. Gruff & Hawkins,
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employing this combination are Arkansas, California, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming.153 There is no bed title question in states
which place bed title in the abutting upland owners whether the
inland water is navigable or nonnavigable. Those states are
Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, and Ohio.154 The bed
title question could arise in the future in Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, and New Mexico, since they have not ruled on their
choices of navigability definition.15 5 As the above lists make
209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Delacroix
Corp., 285 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 1973).Minnesota: State v. Adams, 251
Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
Missouri: Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Burke v.
Colley, 495 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. App. 1973). Montana: City of Missoula v.
Bakke, 121 Mont. 534, 198 P.2d 769 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
67-712 (1970). Nevada: State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros., 86 Nev. 872, 478
P.2d 159 (1970) (by implication). Oklahoma: Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933
(Okla. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 338 (West 1971). Tennessee:
Huxley v. American Enka Corp., 93 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
Utah: Nephi Irr. Co. v. Bailey, 111 Utah 402, 181 P.2d 215 (1947).
Washington: Shively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956);
Knutson v. Reichel, 10 Wash. App. 293, 518 P.2d 233 (1973). Wyoming:
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
3. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin employ the sawlog or
recreational boat definition of navigability. See, e.g., North Dakota:
Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949). South
Dakota: Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-17-4 (1967). Wisconsin: Munninghoff
v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712
(1949).
4. Kansas employs other definitions of navigability more extensive
than the commercial navigability definition. See, e.g., Dougan v.
Shawnee County Comm'rs, 141 Kan. 554, 43 P.2d 223 (1935).
5. Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, and Ohio
have not defined navigability for bed title purposes. See, e.g., Ala-
bama: Hood v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 408, 165 So. 219 (1936). Arizona: State
v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971), aff'd on
rehearing, 108 Ariz. 258,495 P.2d 1312 (1972), rev'd on other grounds,
414 U.S. 313 (1973) (dictum). Kentucky: City of Princeton v. Martin, 293
Ky. 815, 170 S.W.2d 660 (1943). Michigan: Bourgeois v. United States,
545 F.2d 727 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Ottawa Shores Home Owners Ass'n v.
Lechlak, 344 Mich. 366, 73 N.W.2d 840 (1955). New Mexico: State ex rel.
State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d
421 (1945) (dictum). Ohio: Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686
(1890); Akron Canal & Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio App. 93,50
N.E.2d 897 (1943).
For state navigability definition cases, see notes 68-71 supra.
153. See note 152(1)-(2) supra; appendix infra.
154. For states which finesse the bed title question in that manner, see notes 50
and 152 supra; appendix infra.
155. See note 51(5) supra.
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clear, the state bed title question exists in only six of the thirty-
two states created from federal territories.
III. SUMMARY
The following set of rules concerning ownership of beds of
navigable and nonnavigable inland waters in states created
from federal territories can be derived from existing case law.
1. Title to beds of inland waters which are navigable under
the federal definition pass to a state upon its admission to
the Union unless there has been a previous conveyance
by the United States. The state may dispose of titles to
those beds in any manner it pleases.
2. Title to beds of inland waters which are nonnavigable
under the federal definition remain in the United States
at statehood.
a. The United States by express indication of intention
may sever title to the bed of the waters from the
upland and retain ownership of the bed when it
conveys the upland.
b. In the absence of express intent, title to the bed of the
waters will be disposed of, as a matter of federal law,
using the local state property rule as a guide.
(1) If the local state property rule attaches own-
ership of the bed of federally nonnavigable in-
land waters to the upland, the patentees of the
upland will receive title to the bed as well.
(2) If the local state property rule places ownership
of the bed of waters in the state, title to the bed
remains in the United States, which may dispose
of title to these beds as it pleases. This result
would occur in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and possibly
Oregon.156
156. See appendix infra.
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Appendix
NAVIGABILITY DEFINITION AND BED OWNERSHIP RULES
IN STATES CREATED FROM FEDERAL TERRITORIES
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